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“The Customer Is Always Right”: Consumer Perception for
“Generic.com” Trademarks
I. Introduction
In medieval England, trademarks were used primarily for the benefit of
merchants and manufacturers.1 By contrast, modern U.S. trademark
jurisprudence has shifted from a solely producer-centric view of trademark
protection to include considerations of consumer interests as well. 2 Indeed,
from the 1980s to today, the dominant justifications of trademark law have
centered upon economic analyses in which “[t]he value of a trademark is in
a sense a ‘hostage’ of consumers.”3 Within this framework of producer- and
consumer-centric theories of trademark protection, it is an “undisputed
principle” that the element of “consumer perception” ultimately
“demarcates a term’s meaning.”4
The use of trademarks to protect both businesses and consumers is a
focus reflected within federal trademark statutes. In 1946, Congress enacted
the Lanham Act5 to “secure to the owner of [a] mark the goodwill of his
business” and to protect the consumers’ ability to distinguish between
competing goods and services through trademark registration.6 The Lanham
Act serves these goals by providing federal protection for trademarks that
are “used in commerce” and registered on the “principal register” of the
1. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1849–50 (2007) (noting that medieval production marks were used to
protect members of manufacturing guilds); see also BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW: AN
OPEN-SOURCE CASEBOOK 12–16 (version 8, 2021), http://tmcasebook.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/07/BeebeTMLaw-v8-digital_edition.pdf (providing an abridgment and
commentary on McKenna’s article).
2. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (referencing the
benefits of trademark protection for both consumers and producers); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767–68 (1992) (noting that trademarks protect consumers from
deception and producers from unfair competition); S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), as
reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 (emphasizing protection of the public’s
purchasing interests and the trademark owner’s product investments as the two-fold purpose
of trademark law).
3. BEEBE, supra note 1, at 24 (quoting Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772
F.2d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1985)).
4. USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2304 n.3 (2020).
5. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127).
6. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (emphasis
omitted); see also S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3, 5.
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United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). 7 A “trademark”
may be “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof”
that is used “to identify and distinguish [one’s] goods . . . from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even
if that source is unknown.”8
Registration of a mark with the USPTO is not necessary to achieve
trademark rights.9 Common law trademark rights may be established within
a geographical area solely through use of a mark within that area. 10
Nevertheless, USPTO registration of trademarks provides powerful rights
and advantages beyond those of common law trademarks, including
constructive notice of ownership, prima facie evidence of the mark’s
validity, “incontestable” status after five years on the federal register, and
power “to stop the importation into the United States of articles bearing an
infringing mark.”11 Businesses with a registered trademark may also sue for
“deceptive and misleading use of [their] marks,” which can threaten the
good reputation of their businesses and create unfair competition. 12
Furthermore, the Lanham Act guards consumers against “fraud and
deception . . . by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable
imitations of registered marks,”13 thereby aiding consumers in identifying
the products they wish to purchase or to avoid. 14
Not all marks are eligible for this heightened federal trademark
protection. Only marks that have acquired “distinctiveness” may be
registered under the Lanham Act.15 Both courts and USPTO trademark
examiners evaluate “distinctiveness” for trademark protection using a five7. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1).
8. Id. § 1127.
9. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (“Federal law does not create
trademarks.”).
10. See Optimal Pets, Inc. v. Nutri-Vet, LLC, 877 F. Supp. 2d 953, 958 (C.D. Cal.
2012).
11. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1753.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also id. § 45; Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469
U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (noting that national trademark protection “secur[es] to the producer
the benefits of good reputation”).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
14. See supra note 6 (explaining that trademarks aid consumers in distinguishing
between products and services).
15. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (“In order to be
registered, a mark must be capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods from those of
others.”).
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point scale: (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, and (5)
fanciful. 16 Suggestive marks (such as ORANGE CRUSH for an orangeflavored beverage17), arbitrary marks (such as APPLE for computers 18) and
fanciful marks (such as EXXON for oil products or KODAK for
photography products19), are always eligible for trademark protection due to
their inherent distinctiveness.20 At the other end of the spectrum, generic
terms (such as “wine”21) are never protectable by trademark because these
refer to a general class of goods. 22 Generic terms are necessarily barred
from federal trademark registration to prevent the creation of a monopoly
on words needed to describe a species of goods and services. 23 In contrast,
descriptive marks24 are neither per se eligible nor ineligible for federal
trademark protection. To achieve trademark registration for a descriptive
mark, an applicant must demonstrate that the mark has acquired “secondary

16. Id.; see also Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976); TMEP § 1209.01 (USPTO, July 2021 ed.).
17. Orange Crush Co. v. Cal. Crushed Fruit Co., 297 F. 892, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
TMEP, supra note 16, § 1209.01(a) (“Suggestive marks . . . require imagination, thought, or
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of . . . goods or services.”).
18. Katz v. Modiri, 283 F. Supp. 2d 883, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); TMEP, supra note 16, §
1209.01(a) (“Arbitrary marks comprise words that are in common linguistic use but . . . do
not suggest or describe a significant ingredient, quality, or characteristic of the [identified]
goods or services.”).
19. Katz, 283 F. Supp. at 893; TMEP, supra note 16, § 1209.01(a) (“Fanciful marks
comprise terms that have been invented for the sole purpose of functioning as a
trademark . . . . Such marks comprise words that are either unknown in the language . . . or
are completely out of common usage.”).
20. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768; TMEP, supra note 16, § 1209.01(a).
21. USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2303 (2020); TMEP, supra note 16,
§ 1209.01(c) (“Generic terms are terms that the relevant purchasing public understands
primarily as the common or class name for the goods or services.”).
22. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly., Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (identifying
generic marks as those that “refer[] to the genus of which the particular product is a
species”); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
23. See BEEBE, supra note 1, at 38 (stating that an exclusive right in generic terms
“would confer a monopoly not only of the mark but of the product by rendering a competitor
unable effectively to name what it was endeavoring to sell”); see also Abercrombie, 537
F.2d at 9 (explaining that one using a generic term to market his product “cannot deprive
competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article by its name”).
24. TMEP, supra note 16, § 1209.01(a) (“[A] descriptive term . . . immediately tells
something about the goods or services.”).
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meaning,” such that it has become distinctive in the public’s mind. 25 In
other words, trademark registrability for descriptive terms under the
Lanham Act is grounded in consumer perception of the mark’s
distinctiveness. Descriptive marks “consisting merely of words descriptive
of the qualities, ingredients, or characteristics of an article of trade” cannot
be registered. 26
The distinctiveness analysis of a “composite” mark (a mark that consists
of a combination of words and designs, of “separable word elements,” or of
“separable design elements”) must account for the mark’s nature as an
assimilation of discernable components.27 The individual components of a
composite mark may not reflect the mark’s significance as a whole. 28
Therefore, when evaluating a composite mark for distinctiveness, the mark
must be evaluated as a whole, not by its separate word or design elements. 29
Under this “anti-dissection rule,” a composite mark may be registrable,
notwithstanding the unregistrable nature of generic components within the
mark, if the mark as a whole has acquired distinctiveness to consumers. 30
However, a composite term must have a different meaning as a whole than
its generic parts. If the generic parts “joined to form a compound have a
meaning identical to the meaning common usage would ascribe to those
words as a compound,”31 the mark is not registrable. 32 For example, the

25. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769; see also Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194 (defining
secondary meaning as “ha[ving] become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce”).
26. Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Pats., 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920)
(recognizing this to be the long-standing position of trademark law); see also Advertise.com,
Inc. v. AOL Advert., Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that marks which
convey only “minimal information about a product or service,” such as by simply providing
its common name, are ineligible for trademark protection).
27. See TMEP, supra note 16, § 1213.02.
28. See In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
29. Estate of P.D. Beckwith, 252 U.S. at 545–46 (noting that a mark must be considered
in its entirety because ”[t]he commercial impression of a trade-mark is derived from it as a
whole, not from its elements separated and considered in detail”); see also Liquid Controls
Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Certain terms may
connote more than the sum of their parts and we must take care to decide the genericness of
these terms by looking to the whole.”).
30. See, e.g., Estate of P.D. Beckwith, 252 U.S. at 544–46 (holding that a composite
mark consisting of a non-registrable descriptive phrase in association with a non-descriptive
phrase as “part of an entirely fanciful and arbitrary design” was distinctive as a whole and,
therefore, registrable).
31. In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d 1017, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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Federal Circuit held that SCREENWIPE was unregistrable because both the
composite mark and its generic components “screen” and “wipe” had an
identical meaning: “wipes for cleaning computer and television screens.” 33
Nevertheless, “the principle that the validity of a mark is to be determined
by looking at the mark as a whole” does not “preclude[] a court from
examining the meanings of the component words in determining the
meaning of the mark as a whole.”34
The registrability of domain name trademarks has notable parallels to the
registrability of composite marks. 35 In the same manner that composite
marks are created by combining words and/or designs, domain names are
created by the combination of a second-level domain (“SLD”), such as
“Wikipedia,” with a top-level domain (“TLD”), such as “.org.” Domain
names are unique identifiers and, therefore, can only be held by a single
entity. In the Supreme Court’s first ruling on domain names, United States
Patent and Trademark Office v. Booking.com B.V., the Court addressed
whether a “generic.com” term (a domain name composed of a generic SLD
with a generic TLD) is per se ineligible for federal trademark registration. 36
This Note addresses the role that Booking.com has played in reinforcing
the existing framework of domain name trademark jurisprudence within the
U.S. trademark system. First, Part II of this Note summarizes the analyses
of the BOOKING.COM mark by the USPTO, appellate courts, and
Supreme Court. Secondly, Part III of this Note examines how the
Booking.com ruling applied existing trademark analyses for mark
registrability. Part IV further highlights that the Supreme Court’s emphasis
on consumer perception to analyze genericism of domain names comports
with applicable precedent, including Goodyear’s Rubber Manufacturing
Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co.,37 an early trademark case analyzing the
registrability of generic terms combined with a generic corporate
designation. Lastly, Part V of this Note demonstrates that the holding of
32. Compare 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 12:39 (5th ed. June 2021 update) (collecting examples in footnote 20 where
the combination of generic terms “create[d] a distinct commercial impression that [wa]s
more than just the sum of its parts”) with id. (collecting examples of generic composite
marks that were not eligible for trademark protection).
33. In re Gould Paper Corp., 834 F.2d at 1018–19.
34. Liquid Controls, 802 F.2d at 938.
35. See In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (referencing
HOTELS.COM as a “composite term”).
36. See USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2301 (2020).
37. 128 U.S. 598 (1888).
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Booking.com serves a key objective of federal trademark registration—
protection of both businesses and consumers.
II. BOOKING.COM to the Supreme Court
In 2011, Booking.com B.V. (“Booking.com”), an online travel booking
organization incorporated in Amsterdam, attempted to register the mark
BOOKING.COM with the USPTO.38 Booking.com stipulated that while
“booking” by itself was purportedly generic, the addition of “.com” to the
mark made it protectable.39 Although the USPTO later did not contest that
there was consumer recognition of the BOOKING.COM mark in the United
States, the USPTO rejected the mark for registration.40 The rejecting
examiner asserted that combining the generic term “booking” with the
generic TLD “.com” formed a generic domain name that referred only to a
class of online booking websites, or alternatively, that the domain name
was merely descriptive and had not acquired distinctiveness through
secondary meaning.41
Upon appeal by Booking.com, the USPTO’s Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board (“TTAB”) held that BOOKING.COM was a generic term
and, therefore, could never merit federal trademark protection. 42
Alternatively, the TTAB determined that even if BOOKING.COM were
descriptive rather than generic, the term lacked secondary meaning and was
still unregistrable.43 In subsequent appeals from the TTAB to the Eastern
District of Virginia,44 the Fourth Circuit,45 and Supreme Court,46 the
38. Complaint at 2, 4, Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d 891 (E.D. Va. 2017)
(No. 1:16-CV-00425).
39. See Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d 891, 906 (E.D. Va. 2017)
(evaluating Booking.com’s assertion that combining “booking” with “.com” created a
“unique identifier” eligible for trademark protection).
40. See USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2305 (2020) (noting the USPTO
argued at the Supreme Court level “only that a consumer-perception inquiry was
unnecessary, not that the lower courts’ consumer-perception determination was wrong”); id.
at 2303 (stating the USPTO examining attorney found BOOKING.COM to be
unregistrable).
41. Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 897.
42. See USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2303.
43. Id.
44. Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 909–10. Decisions from the TTAB
may be appealed to either a United States district court or the Federal Circuit. Booking.com
appealed to the Eastern District of Virginia rather than the Federal Circuit due to a difference
in standards of review. While district courts review a TTAB decision de novo, the Federal
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USPTO continued to argue BOOKING.COM was unregistrable as generic,
relying heavily on the early U.S. trademark case Goodyear.47 Goodyear
held that the addition of a generic corporate designation (such as
“Company,” “Corp.,” or “Inc.”) to a generic term could not produce a
distinctive, protectable trademark because it was incapable of
distinguishing one provider’s services. 48 The Eastern District of Virginia
rejected the USPTO’s application of Goodyear, ruling both that
BOOKING.COM was descriptive and that it had acquired secondary
meaning through consumer recognition. 49 Upon review at the Fourth
Circuit, the USPTO pressed for recognition of a rule that the combination
of a generic term with the generic TLD “.com” is per se generic.50 The
Fourth Circuit rejected this USPTO proposal, noting that other circuits had
previously declined to adopt such a per se rule. 51
On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s
decision, holding that a domain name comprised of generic components (a
“generic.com” term) is neither automatically generic nor automatically nongeneric.52 Rather, the generic.com term must be subjected to the traditional
trademark analysis for genericism, which the Court characterized as
“depend[ing] on whether consumers in fact perceive that term as the name
of a class or, instead, as a term capable of distinguishing among members
of the class.”53 The Supreme Court further affirmed the Fourth Circuit
ruling that BOOKING.COM was a descriptive mark that had gained
Circuit gives greater deference to the TTAB by “reviewing factual findings for substantial
evidence.” Booking.com B.V. v. USPTO, 915 F.3d 171, 186 n.12 (4th Cir. 2019).
45. Booking.com B.V. v. USPTO, 915 F.3d at 184.
46. USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2305–07.
47. Goodyear’s Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598 (1888).
48. See Goodyear, 128 U.S. at 602–03 (stating “the word ‘Company’ only indicates that
parties have formed an association or partnership” and cannot be combined with a generic
term, “without other specification,” to create a protectable mark).
49. Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 923. At the Fourth Circuit, the
USPTO did not challenge “the district court’s finding that BOOKING.COM has acquired
secondary meaning where the mark is deemed descriptive.” Booking.com B.V. v. USPTO,
915 F.3d at 187.
50. Booking.com B.V. v. USPTO, 915 F.3d at 184.
51. Id. at 186 (“We therefore decline to adopt a per se rule and conclude that when
‘.com’ is combined with an SLD, even a generic SLD, the resulting composite may be nongeneric where evidence demonstrates that the mark’s primary significance to the public as a
whole is the source, not the product.”).
52. USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2307 (2020).
53. Id. (emphasis added).
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secondary meaning to consumers and was, therefore, eligible for federal
trademark registration.54
In October 2020, the USPTO issued an updated guide to outline the
examination procedures for “generic.com” terms in light of Booking.com.55
The guide specified that examining attorneys must consider in their
registrability analysis whether a generic.com term is being used “in a
trademark or service marker manner” rather than “solely as a website
address.”56 Although the Supreme Court rejected a per se rule against the
registrability of generic.com terms, the USPTO stated that generic.com
terms may still be rejected for registration based upon the evidence of the
record.57 Each generic.com term must be evaluated on a “case-by-case
basis” to determine whether the term is descriptive and whether it has
acquired secondary meaning to become distinctive. 58
III. Booking.com Comports with Existing Precedent
The USPTO notes that Booking.com has not significantly altered its
evaluation procedures for genericism. 59 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s
rejection of a per se rule against “generic.com” registration has reinforced
the eligibility of certain generic.com domain names—those that are
descriptive and have acquired secondary meaning—for federal protection.
Furthermore, the district court and Fourth Circuit analyses of
BOOKING.COM provide a framework for determining registrability of
“generic.com” terms that is consistent with existing precedent for the
evaluation of composite marks and for the registration of a domain name
mark.

54. Id. at 2308–09.
55. EXAMINATION GUIDE 3-20: GENERIC.COM TERMS AFTER USPTO V. BOOKING.COM
(USPTO 2020), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/TM-ExamGuide-320.pdf.
56. See id. at 5.
57. Id. at 2–3. The USPTO provides examples for what evidence the examiner may use
to reject a generic.com term for registration, based upon consumer understanding of the term
as being generic as a whole. Id. at 3. The Examination Guide also notes that the evidentiary
burden for demonstrating that a generic.com term has acquired secondary meaning is
necessarily heightened because these terms are typically highly descriptive in nature. Id.
58. Id. at 2.
59. See id.
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A. No Previous Per Se Bar from the Courts or USPTO
In the decades preceding Booking.com, the Federal Circuit had several
occasions to address registrability disputes for generic.com terms. In the
Federal Circuit cases of In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP and In re
Hotels.com, the generic.com terms PATENTS.COM and HOTELS.COM,
respectively, were deemed ineligible for trademark registration. 60 These
cases reflect the commonplace occurrence of rejection for the registration of
generic.com marks due to their highly descriptive nature. 61 Despite the
rejections of PATENTS.COM and HOTELS.COM for trademark
registration, the Federal Circuit in Oppedahl & Larson explicitly declined
to create a per se rule regarding the registrability of generic.com marks. 62
Furthermore, as noted by the Ninth Circuit in Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL
Advertising Inc., in no other cases has the Federal Circuit recognized a per
se rule against the registrability of generic.com trademarks.63
Consistent with the Federal Circuit’s approach, the USPTO did not apply
a per se rule against the registration of generic.com trademarks prior to
Booking.com. Although the USPTO advocated for rigid exclusion before
the Supreme Court, examiners had previously granted registration to
roughly eight hundred marks that would not have qualified under such a per
se rule. 64 Examples of generic.com marks that were registered prior to
Booking.com include ART.COM (Reg. No. 3,601,346), DATING.COM
(Reg. No. 2,580,467), and WEATHER.COM (Reg. No. 2,699,088).65

60. In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding
PATENTS.COM to be merely descriptive); In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1306
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding HOTELS.COM to be generic).
61. See In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting the rarity
of a generic.com mark that is eligible for trademark registration).
62. Oppedahl & Larson, 373 F.3d at 1177 (“Thus, this court declines to adopt a per se
rule that would extend trademark protection to all Internet domain names regardless of their
use. Trademark law requires evaluation of a proposed mark to ascertain the commercial
impression conveyed in light of the goods or services associated with the mark . . . .”).
63. Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advert., Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 2010).
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit did not recognize a per se rule that generic.com terms are
unregistrable. Id. at 982.
64. See Brief for the Respondent at 1a–62a app., USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S.
Ct. 2298 (2020) (No. 19-46).
65. Id.
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B. Evaluation of Composite Marks and Domain Names as a Whole
Although no per se rule against “generic.com” terms had been
established prior to Booking.com, the Federal Circuit noted that only “in
rare circumstances” would the addition of “.com” to a generic term result in
a distinctive, protectable mark.66 A generic.com term must be at least
descriptive to qualify for trademark registration. Generic.com terms that are
merely generic can never be registered, regardless of whether the terms
have acquired secondary meaning. 67
The analysis for whether a generic.com term is generic or descriptive
mirrors the evaluation of genericism for composite marks comprised of
generic components. As noted in Part I, composite marks are structurally
similar to domain names in that the two are both comprised of discernable
components.68 The process for evaluating composite marks with generic
components is twofold: (1) consider “the impression conveyed” separately
by the generic components, then (2) evaluate the mark as a whole, rather
than by its parts.69 In several cases prior to Booking.com, the Federal Circuit
applied a similar framework to evaluate genericism of domain name
trademarks, with an emphasis on evaluating the mark as a whole. 70 In the
analysis of BOOKING.COM, the Supreme Court affirmed the use of this
framework by the district court and Fourth Circuit,71 as discussed further in
Section IV.A.

66. Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1297 (citing Oppedahl & Larson, 373 F.3d at 1175).
67. See Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, Inc., 864 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)) (stating that generic terms
are not registrable as trademarks).
68. See supra Part I.
69. Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advert., Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 977–78 (9th Cir. 2010); see
also Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Comm’r of Pats., 252 U.S. 538, 545–46 (1920) (“The
commercial impression of a trade-mark is derived from it as a whole, not from its elements
separated and considered in detail. For this reason it should be considered in its
entirety . . . .”).
70. See, e.g., Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1297 (emphasizing that the public’s
understanding is determined from evaluating the mark as a whole); In re Hotels.com, L.P.,
573 F.3d 1300, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (comparing the meaning communicated by the
individual components of a composite term with that of the composite term as a whole).
71. USPTO v. Booking.com, 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2304 (2020).
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IV. Analysis of Trademark Registrability for BOOKING.COM
A. Consumer Perception: The Key to Escaping Genericism
In a distinctiveness analysis, a generic.com term (like a composite mark)
must be evaluated as a whole, rather than by its parts.72 Generic.com terms
are comprised from a generic SLD with a generic TLD, such as “.com,”
“.biz,” and “.info.”73 The addition of a generic TLD to an otherwise
unregistrable mark does not typically transform the whole into a registrable
mark.74 For example, the mere recognition by consumers that “.com” denotes
use of a commercial website, without more, is insufficient to make a
generic.com term registrable.75 In Advertising.com, Inc. v. AOL Advertising,
Inc., the Ninth Circuit recognized TLDs such as “.com” to be generic
references to businesses that operate through the internet.76 The Ninth Circuit
determined that the combination of “.com” with the generic SLD
“advertising” to create the mark ADVERTISING.COM resulted in nothing
more than a reference to a class of advertising services through the internet,
generally, when the mark was viewed as a whole. 77 Therefore, the proposed
mark was generic.78 Other generic.com terms that have been denied
registration by the TTAB due to genericism include HOTELS.COM,
MATTRESS.COM,
LAWYERS.COM,
BLINDSANDDRAPERY.COM,
CONTAINER.COM, BONDS.COM, and SPORTSBETTING.COM.79
Though uncommon, in some instances, the addition of “.com” may
“convey[] a unique and unexpected character of the services related to the
internet,” such that the TLD “expand[s] the meaning of the mark.” 80 For
example, Steelbuilding.com was a “rare instance” in which a generic TLD
expanded the meaning of an otherwise generic mark. 81 The Federal Circuit
72. See id.
73. In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
74. Id.
75. See Hotels.com, 573 F.3d at 1304.
76. Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advert., Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting
that the term “.com” is a TLD that “reflects an online commercial organization or refers
generically to almost anything connected to business on the internet” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
77. Id. at 982.
78. Id. at 981–82.
79. Id. at 978–79, 979 n.3.
80. Id. at 979 (quoting In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1298–99 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
81. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

236

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:225

found that the combination of the generic term “steelbuilding” with “.com”
transformed the mark from a reference to a class of internet services for
“the mere sale of steel buildings” into a singular reference to a specific
internet service that “allow[ed] the consumer to use an interactive online
feature to design, determine the price of, and then purchase the building.” 82
Consequently, the mark STEELBUILDING.COM was descriptive, rather
than generic. 83
In the Booking.com litigation, the courts faithfully followed this
established framework for analyzing genericism, requiring that
BOOKING.COM be analyzed as a whole, rather than merely by its parts.
The USPTO argued that BOOKING.COM was generic and, therefore,
wholly ineligible for federal registration. 84 In this argument, the USPTO
asserted that the combination of the term’s generic components—“booking”
and the TLD “.com”—resulted in nothing more than a reference to a class
of “online reservation service[s] for travel, tours, and lodgings,” rather than
a reference to a member of that class.85 The Supreme Court rejected this
assertion, affirming the findings of the district court and Fourth Circuit. 86
Booking.com presented Teflon survey evidence 87 indicating that “74.8
percent of respondents identified BOOKING.COM as a brand name” and
not as “a generic name for online booking services.”88 The district court
found that the survey methodology was sound and that the survey results
were representative of consumer understanding of BOOKING.COM.89 The
Fourth Circuit also rejected the USPTO’s assertion that this Teflon survey
was inappropriate evidence of consumer perception. 90 Because consumers
viewed BOOKING.COM as a reference to one specific online reservation

82. Id. (discussing the Federal Circuit’s analysis in Steelbuilding.com).
83. Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1301. Despite this holding, the Federal Circuit
determined that STEELBUILDING.COM was merely descriptive and, therefore, lacked
distinctiveness for trademark registration. Id.
84. USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2305 (2020).
85. Id. at 2303.
86. Id. at 2304.
87. The “Teflon survey method” was used to survey for genericism of the trademark
TEFLON in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida International, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502
(E.D.N.Y. 1975). See BEEBE, supra note 1, at 91–93 for a general discussion of this method.
88. Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d 891, 915 (E.D. Va. 2017).
89. Id. at 918; Booking.com B.V. v. USPTO, 915 F.3d 171, 183 (4th Cir. 2019), aff’d,
USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2304.
90. Booking.com B.V. v. USPTO, 915 F.3d at 183.
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service, rather than as a reference to the class as a whole, the term was
descriptive rather than generic.91
B. Secondary Meaning for “Generic.com” Trademarks
Descriptive terms are only eligible for trademark registration if they have
acquired distinctiveness, or secondary meaning, with consumers. 92
Therefore, a descriptive mark must do “more than convey the genus of the
services offered under the mark” to be eligible for federal registration.93 An
applicant must demonstrate secondary meaning through “a rigorous
evidentiary showing”94 that “in the minds of the public, the primary
significance of a . . . term is to identify the source of the product rather than
the product itself.”95 In other words, a showing of secondary meaning
typically requires that consumers associate the term with a single entity, not
with the product provided.
Within the domain-name system, every domain name is a unique
identifier that can only be held by a single entity. Therefore, courts have
rejected that the mere association between a domain name and one entity
demonstrates distinctiveness.96 The artificial monopoly on a generic.com
term in the domain name system cannot, on its own, establish secondary
meaning.97 Other evidence must be submitted to demonstrate “how the
mark is understood by the purchasing public.” 98 Courts consider six factors
for a showing of consumer perception for secondary meaning: “(1)
advertising expenditures; (2) consumer studies linking the mark to a source;
(3) sales success; (4) unsolicited media coverage of the product; (5)
attempts to plagiarize the mark; and (6) the length and exclusivity of the
91. See id.
92. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985); see also In re
Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1302–03 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Whether a term is entitled to
trademark status turns on how the mark is understood by the purchasing public.”).
93. See Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advert., Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2010).
94. Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 919.
95. Id. at 910 (omission in original) (quoting Inwood Lab’ys, Inc. v. Ives Lab’ys, 456
U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982)).
96. In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1176–77 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The
simple fact that domain names can only be owned by one entity does not of itself make them
distinctive or source identifying. Telephone numbers and street addresses are also unique,
but they do not by themselves convey to the public the source of specific goods or
services.”).
97. Id.; Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 906.
98. See In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1302–03 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting In re
Montrachet S.A., 878 F.2d 375, 376 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
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mark’s use.”99 Therefore, evidence of secondary meaning may include
“print and Internet advertising, declarations from competitors and the
applicant’s own officers, sales data, web site traffic data, . . . customer
communications,” and surveys. 100 However, the value of survey tools to
determine consumer perception of a proposed mark may be limited
depending on factors such as whether an Internet survey prevents visitors of
the site from voting more than once. 101
Highly descriptive terms must overcome a heightened evidentiary burden
to show the secondary meaning required for registration. 102 In
Steelbuilding.com, the term STEELBUILDING.COM was not generic, but
the term’s highly descriptive nature created a burden for the applicant to
demonstrate a heightened level of secondary meaning.103 The court found
that the competitor declarations, customer letters, and survey results
presented by the applicant were insufficient to meet this heightened burden
for consumer perception, due in part to the survey “lack[ing] sufficient
signs of reliability” from its methodology. 104
In the Booking.com litigation, the USPTO did not appeal the
distinctiveness issue to the Fourth Circuit or Supreme Court, thereby
conceding that if BOOKING.COM was descriptive, the term had the
requisite secondary meaning for registration. 105 At the district court level,
the court examined Booking.com’s extensive advertising expenditures,
records of sales success, unsolicited media coverage, social media presence,
and two surveys as evidence of secondary meaning for BOOKING.COM. 106
The court determined that a survey measuring a product’s popularity is “not
probative of secondary meaning” and carries only “minimal weight.” 107
However, the court determined that Booking.com’s Teflon survey—which
had been primarily aimed to determine whether BOOKING.COM was
99. Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 919 (quoting Perini Corp. v. Perini
Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 125 (4th Cir. 1990)).
100. In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1301; see also Perini Corp., 915 F.2d at 125 (“Secondary meaning is the
consuming public’s understanding that the mark, when used in context, refers, not to what
the descriptive word ordinarily describes, but to the particular business that the mark is
meant to identify.”).
104. Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d at 1300.
105. Booking.com B.V. v. USPTO, 915 F.3d 171, 187 (4th Cir. 2019).
106. Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d 891, 919–21 (E.D. Va. 2017).
107. Id. at 920.
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generic—was also a “generally accepted way of measuring secondary
meaning.”108 In other words, the court accepted the Teflon survey as a
reliable measurement for consumer perception of BOOKING.COM.
Because 74.8 percent of respondents identified BOOKING.COM to have
acquired secondary meaning, the mark was deemed eligible for federal
trademark protection.109
C. Post-Booking.com Role of Survey Evidence
The Booking.com litigation highlighted survey evidence as a tool for
demonstrating both non-genericism and secondary meaning of a
generic.com term. Nevertheless, Booking.com did not establish surveys as
the sole means for determining consumer perception of a generic.com
term.110 In affirming the district court, the Fourth Circuit found no error in
“placing greater weight on the consumer survey over other evidence, like
dictionary definitions, in assessing the primary significance to the
public.”111 However, other forms of evidence (such as “purchaser
testimony . . . listings and dictionaries, trade journals, newspapers, and
other publications”112) continue to have some value in the distinctiveness
analysis for generic.com terms.
D. Post-Booking.com Survival of the Goodyear Precedent
In its arguments for a per se rule against registration of a generic.com
term, notwithstanding secondary meaning, the USPTO relied heavily on
Goodyear’s Rubber Manufacturing Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co.113 This
early U.S. trademark case stated that the addition of a generic corporate
designation, such as “Company” or “Corporation,” to an otherwise generic
term cannot transform the whole into a distinctive mark. 114 Based upon
Goodyear, the USPTO argued that adding the TLD “.com,” like the
commercial designation “Corp.,” could not render an otherwise generic
108. Id. (noting that the Fourth Circuit generally considers survey evidence to be “the
most direct and persuasive way of establishing secondary meaning”).
109. See id.
110. An in-depth discussion of the merits of survey evidence is beyond the scope of this
Note.
111. Booking.com B.V. v. USPTO, 915 F.3d 171, 184 (4th Cir. 2019).
112. Id. at 181 (quoting Glover v. Ampak, Inc., 74 F.3d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1996)).
113. 128 U.S. 598 (1888); see Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 909–10;
Booking.com B.V. v. USPTO, 915 F.3d 171, 184 (4th Cir. 2019); USPTO v. Booking.com
B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2305–07 (2020).
114. Goodyear, 128 U.S. at 602–03.
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mark distinctive. 115 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, returning its
analysis of trademark eligibility to the paramount importance of consumer
perception. 116 Notwithstanding the Goodyear precedent, the Court asserted
that the Lanham Act is wholly “incompatible with an unyielding legal rule
that entirely disregards consumer perception,” such as the proposed per se
rule against generic.com registrability. 117
Despite the rejection of a new per se rule based on Goodyear, the
Supreme Court did not abrogate the Goodyear precedent through
Booking.com. The dissimilarities between generic corporate designations
and generic TLDs permit harmonization of the two cases. As the Federal
Circuit previously noted, “the per se rule in Goodyear that ‘Corp.’, etc.
never possess source-indicating significance does not operate as a per se
rule, but more as a general rule, with respect to TLDs” because “TLDs
immediately suggest a relationship to the Internet.” 118 In keeping with the
Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court distinguished the BOOKING.COM
mark from “Goodyear, Co.” based on the exclusive nature of internet
domains. 119
The Supreme Court also rejected the USPTO’s framing of the Goodyear
precedent. 120 As noted by amici in Booking.com, the Goodyear principle
substantially predates the Lanham Act’s offering of trademark protection
for descriptive terms, as well as the emergence of internet companies and
domain name branding. 121 In light of these new areas of trademark law, the
Supreme Court clarified Goodyear as a “modest principle” existing in
harmony with the Lanham Act.122 Specifically, the modest Goodyear
principle is that “[a] compound of generic elements is generic if the
combination yields no additional meaning to consumers capable of
distinguishing the goods or services.” 123 Therefore, contrary to the
USPTO’s argument, Goodyear created no overarching per se rule against
115. See Booking.com B.V. v. Matal, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 910; Booking.com B.V. v.
USPTO, 915 F.3d at 184; USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2305–06.
116. USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2306 (noting that a consumer-centered
analysis for whether a term is generic is a “bedrock principle of the Lanham Act”).
117. Id.
118. In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
119. USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2306.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Brief of Coalition of .Com Brand Owners as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 36–37, USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298 (No. 19-46).
122. USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2306.
123. Id.
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the registrability of all marks composed of generic elements. Because the
Court has framed Goodyear in such a nuanced manner post-Booking.com,
the case should not be considered abrogated.
V. Looking Forward from Booking.com
A. Producer-Centric and Consumer-Centric Benefits of Booking.com
Booking.com fits comfortably into the preexisting producer-centric and
consumer-centric justifications for trademark protection. Under the Lanham
Act, businesses that create consumer recognition of a descriptive mark,
such that it has acquired secondary meaning, should benefit from the rights
endowed by federal registration. 124 Similarly, consumers who wish to
purchase goods and services from a particular source benefit from a robust
system in which deceptive trademark practices are discouraged. 125 These
theories of trademark protection extend logically to the growing field of
domain name trademarks. The USPTO’s proposed per se rule against
generic.com marks would have precluded the registration of descriptive
terms that had acquired secondary meaning. Such a rule would have
deprived businesses of valuable federal rights that would normally follow
from the cultivation of consumer recognition in a descriptive mark.
Notwithstanding federal trademark registration, businesses with
generic.com branding may benefit from the exclusivity of the domain name
system, such as by choosing domain names with terms commonly searched
by online consumers. However, this phenomenon should not preclude these
businesses from enjoying rights that the U.S. trademark system would
otherwise offer to qualifying descriptive marks. The Lanham Act supports a
framework that allows producers who foster commercial goodwill under a
mark to reap the benefits of that investment. 126 The USPTO’s per se rule
would also have undermined the paramount importance of consumer
perception in dictating a term’s meaning and registrability127 by entirely
circumventing this element in the registrability analysis.
The benefits of federal registration for generic.com marks, both to
producers and consumers, outweigh the convenience of a one-size-fits-all
124. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274,
1275.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985);
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751–52 (2017).
127. USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2304 n.3.
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rule regarding generic.com registrability. For producers, federal registration
provides greater protection to generic.com marks than unfair competition
law, which merely requires competitors to “make more of an effort” to
reduce confusion between marks. For example, federal trademark
registrants can actively prevent competitors from marketing products under
their registered marks.128 Federal registration also aids producers in using
private dispute resolution rather than litigation to stop domain name
abuse.129 By rejecting the USPTO’s proposed per se rule, the Supreme
Court protected distinctive generic.com terms from receiving a blanket
rejection for these, and other, valuable federal protections.
Consumers also benefit when deceptive uses of domain names can be
efficiently confronted. The Booking.com ruling supports preexisting
frameworks for domain name protection. Due to the prima facie proof of
trademark rights from registration, businesses with domain name
trademarks may more easily remove domain names that are being used to
mislead consumers as to the source of goods and services. For example, the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”) prevents “the bad
faith, abusive registration and use of the distinctive trademarks of others as
Internet domain names, with the intent to profit from the goodwill
associated with those trademarks.” 130 Although holders of unregistered,
common-law trademarks for a domain name may still benefit from ACPA
protections, the presumed validity of a domain name mark by federal
registration makes it easier to prove rights in the mark and obtain swift
legal remedies, such as a court order for cancellation of the bad-faith
domain name. 131 The ability to quickly respond to deceptive, bad-faith
trademark uses such as these provides greater security for the consumer
when making purchasing decisions.
B. Low Anti-Competitive Threat of “Generic.com” Trademarks
The protections of generic.com mark registration pose a minimal anticompetitive threat. During the Booking.com litigation, the USPTO
stipulated that registration of BOOKING.COM would be used to prevent
competitors from registering similar domain name trademarks, such as
128. See Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 151 (2d Cir. 1997).
129. See Brief of Coalition of .Com Brand Owners as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, supra note 121, at 14–19.
130. Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 481 (3d Cir. 2001); see also 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol74/iss2/6

2022]

NOTE

243

“EBOOKING.COM” or “HOTEL-BOOKING.COM.”132 The Supreme
Court accepted the assurances of Booking.com that it recognized its
generic.com mark would provide a very limited scope of protection. 133
However, the concern remains that other registrants of generic.com
trademarks might aim to exercise a wider scope of protection than
Booking.com. Because no two businesses can hold the same domain name
online, regardless of trademark registration, 134 the mere exclusivity that
federal registration creates in a mark provides no new value to the
registrant. Consequently, Booking.com opponents have claimed that federal
rights in a generic.com trademark will inevitably be exercised broadly
against non-identical domain names. 135
These concerns are not new. The Federal Circuit has previously
considered the risk that generic.com trademark holders might exercise their
rights against users of non-identical variations of their domain names. 136
However, the risks cited for overreaching uses of generic.com trademarks
are common to the class of all descriptive marks that are permitted federal
registration. Under the Lanham Act, the current U.S. trademark system has
found that the benefits of registration for descriptive marks with secondary
meaning outweigh these concerns of scope. As such, the preexisting
safeguards for constraining the scope of registered descriptive marks need
not be reimagined to respond to the registration of generic.com marks.
VI. Conclusion
The Booking.com decision has not significantly altered the examination
procedures for evaluating genericism. However, the Supreme Court’s
rejection of a per se rule against “generic.com” trademarks reinforces both
132. USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2307.
133. Id. at 2308.
134. Advertise.com, Inc. v. AOL Advert., Inc., 616 F.3d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“[O]nly a single entity can hold a domain name at any given time . . . .”).
135. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of
Petitioners at 10, USPTO v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. at 2298 (No. 19-46) (asserting
that a mark such as BOOKING.COM might be used to exclude similar domain names, such
as “ebooking.com, bookings.com, or booker.com”).
136. Advertise.com, 616 F.3d at 980–81 (“[G]ranting trademark rights over a domain
name composed of a generic term and a TLD grants the trademark holder rights over far
more intellectual property than the domain name itself. In addition to potentially covering all
combinations of the generic term with any TLD (e.g., “.com”; “.biz”; “.org”), such
trademark protection would potentially reach almost any use of the generic term in a domain
name.”).
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producer- and consumer-centric benefits for the protection of these marks.
The rejection of the USPTO’s proposed per se rule also builds consistently
upon existing trademark precedent for domain names, emphasizing the
paramount importance of consumer perception in the genericism analysis.
Therefore, by green-lighting registration of descriptive, consumerrecognized generic.com marks, the Supreme Court has provided a path for
generic.com trademark registration that is consistently based upon both
policy and precedent.
Sarah M. Simpson (Oliver)
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